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more coherent theory emerges, however, if his argument is set in its historical context and compared with that
of Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Locke rejected retributivism in all but its weakest version and grounded
punishment in two distinct rationales, protection of society and restitution for victims. In doing so, Locke’s
theory challenges the dichotomy between forward-looking and backward-looking rationales and
contemporary conceptions of the domain of ‘‘punishment.’’
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Retribution and Restitution in Locke’s Theory of
Punishment
Alex Tuckness Iowa State University
Locke’s theory of punishment initially appears to be a confused combination of retributive considerations that base
punishment on desert and forward-looking considerations that base punishment on future benefits. A more
coherent theory emerges, however, if his argument is set in its historical context and compared with that of Grotius,
Hobbes, and Pufendorf. Locke rejected retributivism in all but its weakest version and grounded punishment in two
distinct rationales, protection of society and restitution for victims. In doing so, Locke’s theory challenges the
dichotomy between forward-looking and backward-looking rationales and contemporary conceptions of the
domain of ‘‘punishment.’’
John Locke defined political power as ‘‘a Right ofmaking Laws with Penalties of Death, and con-sequently all less Penalties’’ to protect the prop-
erty of the community, defend it from foreign attack,
and promote the public good (TT, 2.3).1 The power
to punish is thus at the very center of Locke’s under-
standing of political power. As will be seen below,
discussions of punishment permeate almost all of
Locke’s major writings as well as numerous minor
works and unpublished manuscripts. Nonetheless,
Locke’s theory of punishment remains understudied
compared to other aspects of his thought such as pro-
perty or toleration. When Locke’s theory of punish-
ment is discussed, the main topics are normally
Locke’s claim that any individual may punish viola-
tions of natural rights in the state of nature and his
account of how the right to punish is transferred from
individuals to the government. This article instead
examines the question of what types of actions for
Locke count as punishment and what rationales
should govern the implementation of punishment.
For several decades, philosophers who debate
punishment theory have often divided rationales for
punishment into those that are forward-looking
or backward-looking (Ellis 1995; Goldman 1982;
Honderich 2006; McDermott 2001; Thompson
1966). Forward-looking rationales justify punishment
by showing that there will be likely future benefits
(normally for the society) and thus often seek to
punish in a way and to the degree that most benefits
society in the future. Typical forward-looking reasons
for punishment are protecting society from a danger-
ous person, deterring future crimes, reducing recid-
ivism, rehabilitating the criminal, and helping the
economy by engaging the convict in productive labor.
Backward-looking reasons, on the other hand, mete
out punishment by looking at something in the past.
Retributive rationales, for example, try to proportion
the punishment to the wickedness of the crime.
Rationales of restitution look at some previous state
of affairs that existed between the criminal and victim
and seek to restore that state to the extent possible by
means of punishment. Any given theory of punish-
ment must decide which of these rationales to recog-
nize and how much weight to give them since they
often suggest different punishments.
These debates are more than theoretical. Some
empirical evidence links public endorsement of
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1References to the Locke’s primary works will be given as follows: ECHU 5 Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1979) by
book, chapter, and section number; L 5 Letter Concerning Toleration (Locke 1983) by page number; PE 5 Political Essays (Locke 1997)
by page number; R 5 The Reasonableness of Christianity (Locke 1965) by paragraph number; STCE 5 Some Thoughts Concerning
Education (Locke 1996) by section number; TT 5 Two Treatises of Government (Locke 1988) cited by treatise and section number;
W 5Works (Locke 1963) by volume and page number. References to Grotius (2005) and Pufendorf (1934, 1991) will be by book,
chapter, and section number. Original formatting and punctuation in primary texts are retained unless otherwise noted, but spellings
have been modernized.
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retributive punishment to support for more severe
punishments (Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson 2000;
Warr, Meier, and Erickson 1983). The question is
also of significant interest internationally. The gov-
erning document of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) espouses deterrence in its preamble while
including language that suggests both retributivism
and restitution in its main text (Rome Statute of the
ICC 1998, Preamble and Articles 75 and 79). To the
extent that the ICC is guided by early war crimes
trials, such as Nuremberg, it is likely to justify
punishment using retributive rationales. More recent
predecessors such as the International Criminal
Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda often try to
combine retributive and deterrence rationales with-
out giving a coherent account of how these are to be
reconciled when they conflict (Henham 2003, 85–89).
New governments trying to grapple with human
rights violations by the previous regime must also
grapple with trade-offs between retributive punish-
ment of offenders and forward-looking considera-
tions aimed at furthering the public good (Allen
1999) and will thus have to make assessments about
the importance of competing rationales for
punishment.
Locke’s views on punishment are particularly
important to understand at a time when the language
of ‘‘victims’ rights’’ is often used to justify harsh retri-
butive punishments while little is done to actually
provide restitution for the victims of crime (Dubber
2002). If Locke’s views are set in their historical and
intellectual context, we see that Locke rejected re-
tributivism in both its moderate and strong forms. In
its place, Locke identifies two distinct grounds for
punishment: the protection of society (including
deterrence) and restitution (or ‘‘reparation’’ as Locke
sometimes says). Restitution can be thought of either
as a rationale for punishment or as a policy of punish-
ment justified by other rationales. Locke’s account of
restitution shows that Locke saw restitution as a
distinct rationale that affirmed both the value of the
victim being compensated and the offender making
payments. The significance of this account is both
historical and contemporary. Historically, it im-
proves our understanding of Locke by connecting
his theory of punishment more closely with his view
that governments exist to uphold the rights of
individual citizens and presenting a more coherent,
less contradictory theory of punishment. Locke’s
theory of punishment also contributes to contempo-
rary debates in two ways. First, Locke’s conceptual
categories challenge current conceptualizations of the
domain of punishment. Contemporary approaches
often (though inconsistently) conceptualize the ques-
tion of compensation as distinct from the question of
punishment. Locke does distinguish the compensa-
tion of victims from the protection of society, but he
sees both of these as part of punishment. Second,
Locke’s account of restitution renders problematic
the distinction between forward and backward look-
ing reasons for punishment and suggests that we
should move beyond that distinction. Restitution as a
distinct Lockean rationale for punishment is not
adequately described as either forward-looking or
backward-looking, but rather as a rationale that allo-
cates future benefits on the basis of historically
grounded claims.
Punishment in Seventeenth-Century
Theory and Practice
Locke’s theory of punishment is easily misunderstood
if it is not placed in its historical and intellectual
context. Locke’s occasional use of words that to a
modern reader signal the presence of a retributive
theory actually show commonalities between him and
earlier seventeenth-century thinkers who occasionally
used such language while clearly rejecting retributive
theories. While Locke’s most important seventeenth-
century predecessors disagreed on many aspects of
punishment, there is surprising agreement on the
claim that punishment should only be inflicted if it
will bring about some good in the future, most
notably deterring other potential criminals, restrain-
ing the criminal himself,2 or even helping (reform-
ing) the criminal. Both Hugo Grotius and Thomas
Hobbes rejected retributive rationales for punish-
ments. Samuel Pufendorf did as well, but also added
an important nuance in that he continued to use the
word ‘‘retribute’’ in a positive way even though he
had rejected retributive theories. This is important
because there is significant evidence that Locke was
influenced by Pufendorf as he was writing the Two
Treatises (Marshall 1994, 145).3 In fact, there is
evidence that he was reading Pufendorf at the same
time he was composing it.
2Masculine pronouns are used so as not to prejudge how
seventeenth-century writers would have applied their theories
to women.
3On Pufendorf’s influence, see also Seidler (1990, 9). For Locke’s
praise of Pufendorf see STCE, 186. They disagreed about whether
there could be punishment in the state of nature (Pufendorf
1934, 8.3.7).
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Hugo Grotius argued in his unpublished Com-
mentary on the Law of Prize [De Jure Praedae] that the
goals of public punishment are chastisement, which
aims at correcting the offender to render him ‘‘more
useful to humanity,’’ exemplary punishment, which
seeks to deter future crime, and security (2006, 30–
32). It is a fault, he claimed, to punish ‘‘when neither
the good of the person nor the common good is kept
in view’’ (2006, 63). In his more well-known work,
The Rights of War and Peace [Ius ad Belli ac Pacis], he
stated that ‘‘one Man cannot justly be punished by
another, for Punishment’s Sake’’ (2005, 20.5.4).
Rather, there must be some future benefit that the
punishment will achieve for the offender, the victim,
or society (2005, 20.6.2-20.9.6).
Hobbes also took a forward-looking view of
punishment. In The Elements of Law (1994, 91), On
the Citizen [De Cive] (1998, 49), and Leviathan (1991,
106), he argued that punishment should be inflicted
based on the future good to be achieved rather than
past wrongs. There is no sense that a given amount of
punishment must be inflicted based on the severity of
the crime. He said in Leviathan, ‘‘That in Revenges,
(that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,) Men look not at
the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the
good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict
punishment with any other design, than for correc-
tion of the offender, or direction of others’’ (1991,
106). In a later passage Hobbes wrote: ‘‘seeing the end
of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler;
but correction, either of the offender or others by his
example,’’ therefore the severest punishments should
be directed at those crimes that are most dangerous
to the public (1991, 240). What Hobbes is doing in
these passages is identifying ‘‘revenge’’ and ‘‘retribu-
tion’’ with a passion, the desire to hurt those who
have hurt us. He acknowledges the reality of that
passion, but encourages people to restrict its appli-
cation so that it does not guide punishment.
Pufendorf wrote that ‘‘the purpose of punish-
ment is either the good of the criminal, or the interest
of the person for whom it would have been better if
the crime had not been committed and who thus has
been injured by the crime, or everyone’s interest
without distinction’’ (1991, 2.13.7). In his more
detailed treatment he defines punishment as ‘‘an evil
of suffering that is inflicted in proportion to an evil of
action, or as some troublesome evil which is imposed
upon a man by way of coercion, and by the authority
of the state, in view of some antecedent crime.’’
(1931, 8.3.4). While this definition (‘‘in proportion’’)
at first glance implies a retributive view of punish-
ment, Pufendorf claimed later that:
the fact that the more guilty are punished more severely,
and the less guilty less severely, comes about only by
consequence and by accident, not because that was
intended primarily and for its own sake. For in impos-
ing a penalty for a crime, that crime need not necessa-
rily be compared with another, nor the punishment
meted out in both cases be proportioned in accordance
with the respective gravity of the offences, but to each
crime, separately, as it were, from all others, there is
accorded a punishment, more or less severe, as it
appears more to the advantage of the state, although
it usually happens that the punishment in question is
proportioned to the seriousness of the crime. (1934,
8.3.5)
Here we see a crucial step in the redefining of
retribution. In general worse crimes will get harsher
penalties, but this is only ‘‘accidental’’ since the
punishments are set with the public good as the goal,
not retribution.
Pufendorf, therefore, determined the amount of
punishment based on the future good it will produce
(1991, 2.13.6–7). In this he followed Grotius and
Hobbes. What Pufendorf added was a conscious
decision to take retributive-sounding phrases, like
deserved punishment, and use them in a nonretrib-
utive way. One might, for example, think Pufendorf
was being inconsistent when he wrote ‘‘Nor is it in
fact always unjust to return a greater evil for a less [in
war], for the objection made by some that retribution
should be rendered in proportion to the injury, is
true only of civil tribunals, where punishments are
meted out by superiors’’ (1934, 8.6.7). In this passage
Pufendorf seems to endorse the idea that civil punish-
ments should be based on proportionate retribution
while denying that punishments in war follow the
same pattern. This is precisely the sort of statement
Locke occasionally makes.
In fact, Pufendorf explains that retributive-
sounding language need not be taken in a retributive
way. When he takes up the idea of pardons, he
considers claims by Seneca and other stoics that
pardons are unjust if they give the offender a lighter
sentence than what his deeds deserve. This forces him
to deal with the issue of desert directly. Pufendorf
responds:
But there lurks a mistake in the word ‘‘deserved’’
[debita]. For if you understand that punishment is
‘‘deserved’’ by him who has sinned, that is, that he
can be punished without injury, or without just cause
for complaints, it will not follow that, if a man does not
inflict punishment, he does what he should not do. For
. . . it is not correct to say that a transgressor is owed
[deberi] punishment, as though there was within him
some right which must be satisfied by punishment . . .
But if we take the word ‘‘deserved’’ in the sense that a wise
man is under some obligation to require punishment,
722 alex tuckness
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Tue, 12 Dec 2017 20:35:12 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
we must say, first, that no man is under an obligation in
the matter before us, unless the guardianship of the laws
has been publicly or privately entrusted to his keeping.
And, secondly, that the obligation lying upon sovereigns
concerns not transgressors but the whole state or social
group whose safety they should provide for also by means
of this method of coercing wicked men by means of
punishments. (1934, 8.3.15)
Here Pufendorf shows an alternate way of under-
standing words such as deberi: ‘‘to deserve’’ or ‘‘to be
owed’’ in contexts of punishments. Normally we
think of ‘‘owed’’ as a backward-looking concept,
where some action in the past means that someone
now ought to receive something. In this context, the
punishment that is owed is the one the magistrate
owes to society as a whole in order to protect society.
Thus Pufendorf and those who follow his reasoning
may use words that sound retributive while having an
entirely different meaning in mind.
Pufendorf was willing to follow this line of rea-
soning to its logical conclusion. He thought it impor-
tant that laws be clear and maximum punishments
specified in advance, but did not think it terribly im-
portant that more evil crimes receive stronger pun-
ishments explicitly denying the claim that similarly
evil acts must receive similar punishments (1934,
8.3.23). No one reading Pufendorf would have
thought him a retributivist because of his occasional
references to deserved punishment or punishment
proportionate to the injury; Pufendorf is too em-
phatic in explaining what he means by ‘‘deserved’’ for
that to happen. Yet it is still of interest that Pufendorf
did not say that we should quit using the word
‘‘deserved’’ in discussions of punishment. Instead,
Pufendorf signaled that he would use the word deserv-
ed to describe the punishment which is fitting for
advancing the legitimate interests of the state.
There are several reasons why Locke’s predeces-
sors favored this approach to punishment, all of
which apply to Locke as well and thus provide
reasons for thinking that Locke held the same
position. In the seventeenth century, some groups
argued that the penal laws should mirror the Old
Testament penal code (Cohen 1988; Shapiro 1975;
Zaller 1987). Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf would
have preferred an approach to punishment that gives
the sovereign more flexibility. By rejecting retributive
rationales, they imply that harsh laws cannot be
justified by showing that they were inflicted in the
Old Testament if they will not benefit the public
under present conditions. Additionally, by framing
the power to punish as a power to be used for the
public good, this approach helps to legitimate cen-
tralization of the power to punish under the author-
ity of the sovereign.
They also had concerns about whether it makes
sense for human beings to try to imitate the retrib-
utive justice of God, though for different reasons.
Pufendorf wrote ‘‘It is beyond our grasp to under-
stand what rules the vindictive justice of God
observes’’ (2.3.5). Hobbes went even further in
claiming that our knowledge of God is limited
(1991, 23, 271). Grotius (1889) developed a theory
of the atonement under which God punished Jesus
not because the demands of retributive justice re-
quired it but instead because it would discourage
future sin by setting an example, sometimes called the
governmental theory of the atonement. Locke, as will
seen below, also developed a nonretributive theory of
divine punishment.
Perhaps the most interesting reason they adopted
this position has to do with the logical structure of
the natural law arguments that figure prominently in
their work. All of them understand the laws of nature
to be laws that direct human beings to the attainment
of some future good such as the preservation of life
or the maintenance of sociable relations between
human beings. Hobbes’ laws of nature are precepts
that advise a person about how to preserve his life in
the future (1991, 91). Grotius speaks of natural law as
showing what is fitting for a ‘‘reasonable and social
nature’’ (Grotius 2005, 1.1.12), and Pufendorf treats
laws of nature as principles directing human beings
in how to live sociably with one another (1934 8.3.5,
10, 20). Locke similarly stated that the fundamental
law of nature is ‘‘the preservation of mankind’’ (TT,
2.16). Since the law of nature casts its shadow over
the particular decisions about punishment and since
the law of nature in these theories is oriented around
future goals, it is not surprising that that the general
trend of these theories is away from retributive
punishment.
Locke’s Rejection of Strong and
Moderate Retributivism
The most thorough previous treatment of Locke’s
theory of punishment argues that while it is possible
that Locke’s views on punishment are purely for-
ward-looking, it is more likely that his thought is
simply overdetermined, combining language that is
clearly backward-looking and retributive with forward-
looking goals such as deterrence and protection
of society (Simmons 1992, 128). In fact, Locke’s
locke’s theory of punishment 723
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theory of punishment is only retributive in the
weakest sense of the term, and Locke was part of a
tradition in the seventeenth century that used lan-
guage that sounds retributive to contemporary read-
ers in a nonretributive way. The backward-looking
aspect of Locke’s theory does not come from a
retributive rationale, but rather a reparative one.
Simmons has argued that Locke’s thought, in
general, is overdetermined in that Locke presents
both Kantian and rule-consequentialist justifications
for his main principles. Simmons argues that pre-
cisely this phenomenon is at work in passages like the
following where Locke wrote:
And thus in the State of Nature, one Man comes by a
Power over another; but yet no Absolute or Arbitrary
Power, to use a Criminal when he has got him in his
hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless
extravagancy of his own Will, but only to retribute to
him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what
is proportionate to his Transgression, which is so much
as may serve for Reparation and Restraint. For these two
are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do
harm to another, which is that [which] we call punish-
ment. (TT, 2.8)
Locke here combines talk both about retribution
proportionate to transgression and punishment based
on future protection of society and restitution.
Similar examples can be drawn from elsewhere in
the Second Treatise. Locke wrote a few paragraphs
later that ‘‘Each Transgression may be punished to
that degree, and with so much Severity as will suffice
to make it an ill bargain to the Offender, give him
cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the
like’’ (TT, 2.12). This passage supports the forward-
looking reading of Locke’s theory (even bringing the
offender to the point of ‘‘repenting’’ is a future goal),
but Simmons cites two other places where Locke uses
retributive language. Locke speaks of an act that
‘‘deserves Death’’ (TT, 2.23) and says that a man in
the state of nature has a power ‘‘to judge of, and
punish the breaches of that Law in others, as he is
persuaded the Offence deserves, even with Death
itself, in Crimes where the heinousness of the Fact,
in his Opinion, requires it’’ (TT, 2.87).4 To these
passages cited by Simmons could be added others in
Locke’s various writings where he uses the word
‘‘retribute.’’ The English translation of Locke’s Letter
Concerning Toleration in Locke’s day, by William
Popple, says that when there is a conflict between the
magistrate and the people, ‘‘God, I say, is the only
Judge in this case, who will retribute [rependit] unto
everyone at the last day according to his Deserts; that
is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in
endeavoring to promote Piety, and the public Weal
and Peace of Mankind’’ (L, 49).5 This quotation is
typical as Locke often says God will reward and
punish people as their deeds deserve (R, 6). Simmons
thus has significant textual grounds for saying that
Locke is combining both kinds of arguments.6
To say that Locke was not a ‘‘retributivist’’ risks
anachronism because contemporary usage of the word
may carry connotations that Locke’s use of the term
‘‘retribute’’ did not. This article will deal with this
issue by getting behind the label to identify several
substantively different positions that might be classi-
fied as ‘‘retributive’’ 7 and then asking whether Locke
did or did not affirm them. The term ‘‘retributive’’ is
now generally used of backward-looking theories that
inflict punishment based on desert, but there are
several versions of retributivism. The weak version
of retributivism, made famous by Hart (1968), claims
only that guilt is a necessary condition for inflicting
punishment on someone, not that notions of desert
should determine how much punishment a person
receives. It is an alternative to utilitarian theories
where an innocent person could be punished if doing
so would produce enough utility. The moderate
version of retributivism would claim that notions of
desert are an important aspect of the criminal sen-
tencing process, but not the only part. While notions
of desert might provide a starting point for determin-
ing the proper punishment, other considerations
could legitimately increase or decrease the punish-
ment. The strong version of retributivism would claim
that we have a duty to punish people proportionately
to the seriousness of the moral wrong they have
committed irrespective of other considerations. Kant
has often been read this way, though not all Kant
commentators agree with that interpretation and
4Even these passages about capital punishment are not as clear as
they may seem, since in other contexts Locke describes people
who act contrary to natural law as people who give up the rights
of human beings and consent to be treated as dangerous wild
animals. While Locke may think they ‘‘deserve’’ this demotion in
status, it is unlikely that the amount of force to be used against an
animal would be a matter of desert.
5I utilize Locke 1968 edited by Klibansky and Gough for the Latin
text.
6Simmons cites Farrell (1988) as an example of someone whose
view of Lockean punishment is consequentialist, though it should
be noted that Farrell makes this point only in passing in an article
about the permissibility of punishment apart from the state. See
also Lamprecht (1962, 161–63). For a discussion applied to the
international context see Lang (2008).
7There is a vast literature in contemporary philosophy on
retribution and punishment. See, for example, Cottingham
(1979), Dolinko (1991), Honderich (2006), Morris (1968),
Murphy (1992), and Walker (1991).
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those who utilize Kantian approaches today are found
in both the moderate and strong camps.8
The weakest sense of ‘‘retributivist’’ is one that
forbids punishment on grounds of usefulness alone.
There are texts which call into doubt whether Locke
was a retributivist even in this weak sense. Locke
takes up the issue of just punishment in the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding when he considers
the relationship between punishment and personal
identity. ‘‘Person’’ is for Locke a ‘‘forensic’’ term
indicating that one can be held responsible for one’s
choices (ECHU, 2.27.26). In one of his most famous
examples, he wrote:
to punish Socrates waking, for what sleeping Socrates
thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of,
would be no more of Right, than to punish one Twin
for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew
nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they
could not be distinguished; for such Twins have been
seen. (ECHU, 2.27.19)
The clear upshot of this argument is that, in principle,
it is wrong to punish a person for actions that he
cannot reasonably regard himself as having voluntarily
chosen. If in one physical body there are effectively
two different centers of consciousness with no ability
to regard the other’s choices as one’s own, then one
cannot be punished for what the other has chosen.
If Locke were a weak retributivist, one might
assume that he would never allow the punishment of
people who have no conscious memory of their
crimes, such as sleepwalkers. Locke took up this very
issue, but instead claimed that a drunk person who
has no memory of his crime or a person sleepwalking
in a similar predicament are still justly punishable by
human legal systems. ‘‘Human Laws punish both
with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledge:
Because in these cases, they cannot distinguish cer-
tainly what is real, what counterfeit; and so the
ignorance in Drunkenness or Sleep is not admitted
as a plea’’ (ECHU, 2.27.22). There is no way for
human courts to know for sure if such a claim is
truthful and thus, although it is a valid excuse, it is
not allowed. The implicit reason seems to be con-
sequentialist. While there would be some injustice to
the bona fide sleepwalker who is punished, allowing
such excuses would encourage people to commit
crimes in hopes of using such an excuse to evade
punishment. This illustration could, therefore, be
used to show that Locke permits punishment of
innocent people on consequentialist grounds.
Despite this counterexample, there are good
reasons to think that Locke did in fact limit punish-
ment to those who are guilty. When Locke gave fuller
expressions of his theory of punishment in his later
writings on religious toleration, he consistently ar-
gued that it was wrong to punish someone who had
not, in fact, done anything wrong. In the Second
Letter on Toleration, he wrote that it is unlawful ‘‘to
punish a man without a fault’’ and it is not made
lawful because some good effect should accidentally
arise from the punishment (W, 6: 69). This is a clear
repudiation of the notion that actual guilt is
irrelevant.
Locke made use of a similar line of argument in
response to his opponent, Jonas Proast, who claimed
that dissenters from the state church should be
punished to force them to duly consider the argu-
ments on behalf of the state religion. Locke’s response
was that such a law would be unjust because there
was no way to observe whether a person had
diligently considered something. In practice dissent-
ers would simply be punished for dissenting. Locke
wrote that ‘‘to punish men for that, which it is visible
cannot be known whether they have performed or
no, is so palpable an injustice, that it is likelier to give
them an aversion to the persons and religion that uses
it than to bring them to it’’ (W, 6: 78). In context,
Locke is describing several negative consequences of
persecution and so it is possible that Locke is
affirming a higher order rule about not punishing
people who cannot be known to have committed the
crime in question based on the consequences of such
a rule. The puzzle is that Locke here says we cannot
know whether they have failed to consider ad-
equately, so punishment is illegitimate, yet in the
ECHU he argued that although we cannot know if the
sleepwalker was really sleepwalking, we can punish
him anyway because the common good requires it.
The best resolution to this puzzle lies in noting
the difference in the burden of proof in each case. In
the case of the drunk or the sleepwalker, some action
has been performed that has injured another person.
The person offers an excuse to avoid punishment, but
the excuse cannot be confirmed (Lamprecht 1962,
163). Locke wrote in the case of the sleepwalker: ‘‘the
Fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness
cannot be proved for him’’ (ECHU, 2.27.22). In the
case of the religious dissenter it is whether the law has
even been broken that cannot be determined, and
thus Locke thinks prosecution unjust. Locke is thus
willing to punish in cases where innocence cannot be
ruled out, but not in cases where it is impossible to
verify the crime itself. The consequences of the two
8Compare for example Corlett (2001, 78) with Moore (1989, 104)
for moderate and strong Kantian arguments, respectively.
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principles would be different and so Locke might
justify the distinction on those grounds. The weak
retributivist objects to cases in which one knowingly
punishes an innocent person. In the case of the
sleepwalker, one cannot know that the person one
punishes is innocent. The state can regulate observ-
able actions in a way it cannot regulate unobservable
mental states. If one could do so reliably, Locke
presumably would have no objection to admitting it
as a defense. In the case of the sleepwalker, the state
asserts jurisdiction over an action that has harmed
others, whereas in the toleration case the state is
trying to claim jurisdiction over a belief that Locke
believes has not been shown to harm others.9
The weak version of retributivism that Locke
adopted merely stated that people must have com-
mitted some wrong act before they can be punished.
Normally, when debates are about whether retributi-
vism should guide criminal sentencing, this is not the
version of retribution that is meant. What is of more
importance, therefore, is to discern whether Locke’s
theory uses retributive considerations as substantive
factors in determining how much punishment, or
what type of punishment, a person should receive.
It is a relatively easy matter to show that Locke
was not a strong retributivist. A strong retributivist
would insist that only retributive considerations be
used when deciding punishments. The earlier pas-
sages where Locke appeared to combine retributive
and forward-looking elements are enough to show
that those forward-looking elements have some place
in his theory. Locke wrote in the Second Treatise that
the magistrate ‘‘can often, where the public good
demands not the execution of the Law, remit the
punishment of Criminal Offences by his own Author-
ity’’ (TT, 2.11). The power to impose a lesser penalty
based on considerations of the public good is
precisely the power strong retributivism denies. This
same logic is also used in Locke’s defense of prerog-
ative (TT, 2.159). Moving from theory to practice,
Locke indicated support for an ‘‘Act of Oblivion’’ (PE,
308–09; Stacey 2004, 70) to heal the animosities after
the Glorious Revolution.
Most contemporary advocates of retributivism
are not strong retributivists, so the more interesting
question is whether Locke is a moderate retributivist,
that is, someone who uses notions of desert as the
normal starting point (though not the sole determin-
ing factor) for determining the proper amount of
punishment. Here it is appropriate to turn to Locke’s
most formal definition of punishment. As noted
above, Locke dealt with the question of punishment
in his writings on religious toleration. In the Second
Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke wrote:
Now all punishment is some evil, some inconvenience,
some suffering; by taking away or abridging some good
thing, which he who is punished has otherwise a right
to. Now to justify the bringing any such evil upon any
man, two things are requisite. First, That he who does it
has commission and power so to do. Secondly, That it
be directly useful for the procuring some greater good.
(W, 6: 112)
This passage strongly implies that Locke, like Pufen-
dorf, saw the public good, rather than the allocation
of just deserts, as the goal toward which punishment
aims.
The only reasons to question this conclusion are
the occasional places where Locke talks about punish-
ment being deserved or about the magistrate engaging
in retribution. Given the evidence from Locke’s pred-
ecessors, we already have reason to doubt whether
these phrases should be taken to be an endorsement of
retributive theory when Locke’s more extended dis-
cussions all point in the opposite direction. This
position is strengthened if we look at some of Locke’s
treatments of punishment in other parts of his
thought. Locke deals with punishment in both his
theological writings and his educational writings. It
does not, of course, automatically follow that because
someone does or does not support retributive punish-
ment in one of these spheres of life that one will or
will not support it in another. Nonetheless, we will see
Locke’s tendency in these areas to think of punish-
ment in terms of future benefits even though he
sometimes uses language that sounds retributive.
In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke takes
up the question of God’s punishment of sin and
argues that ‘‘it seems the unalterable purpose of the
divine justice that no unrighteous person, no one that
is guilty of any breach of the law, should be in
paradise: but that the wages of sin should be to every
man, as it was to Adam, an exclusion of him out of
that happy state of immortality, and bring death
upon him’’ (R, 10). He then takes up the question of
why God would demand perfect obedience as the
condition for entering paradise, knowing that man
could not meet this standard. Locke stated that ‘‘It
was such a law as the purity of God’s nature
required’’ since God otherwise:
would have countenanced in him [man] irregularity
and disobedience to that light which he had [reason],
9Pufendorf held the same view, namely that while a backward-
looking criterion (commission of a crime) is necessary for
punishment to begin, it should only proceed where future
benefits are likely (1934, 8.3.8).
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and that rule which was suitable to his nature, which
would have been to have authorized disorder, confu-
sion, and wickedness in his creatures—for that this law
was the law of reason, or, as it is called, of nature, we
shall see by and by, and if rational creatures will not live
up to the rule of their reason, who shall excuse them? If
you will admit them to forsake reason in one point, why
not in another? Where will you stop? To disobey God in
any part of his commands, (and it is he that commands
what reason does) is direct rebellion, which, if dispensed
with in any point, government and order are at an end,
and there can be no bounds set to the lawless exorbi-
tancy of unconfined man. (R, 14)
To say that God’s purity demands punishment of the
wicked at first sounds retributive, but it turns out
that God’s purity is forward-looking. God does not
punish rebellious men with infinite torment,10 but
does exclude them from his kingdom since he will
not countenance rebellion against his authority.
God’s just punishment is thus presented as necessary
for preserving order (perhaps showing the influence
of Grotius). Thus while some of the language seems
retributive, even God is presented as having forward-
looking reasons for punishment. Even when talking
about God’s punishment, deserved punishment can
simply mean that punishment which is proper for
maintaining good order.
These statements of Locke’s make sense against
the background of his command-based understand-
ing of natural law. In Locke’s theory, God is the
legislator of natural law and he chooses his laws based
on what the likely outcomes of those laws will be in
practice (W, 6: 213).11 Similarly, Locke imagines
governments ruling by stated standing laws so that
punishments are announced for different kinds of
infractions that are sufficient to make the crime ‘‘an
ill bargain’’ for the offender (TT, 2.12). If the rule is a
just one and a proper punishment is announced, then
Locke would have no problem saying that the ruler
must retribute accordingly, that is, hand out the
punishment decreed for the crime. In a very real
sense Locke would say the person has chosen that
punishment by breaking a law clearly announced in
advance with clear punishments attached to it. Such a
punishment is fitting, just. Locke can speak in this
way and thus appear to speak the language of a
contemporary retributivist, but we have seen above
that Locke repeatedly distances himself from such
views when he provides more extended discussions of
the topic of punishment.
Locke thought that a good ruler, whether God or
a human magistrate, would articulate clear rules and
punishments and that it is fitting for those who break
those rules to be punished. In setting the punishments,
however, the ruler is not to be looking to inflict pain
for the sake of satisfying some antecedent moral
principle that those who do such and such must suffer
to such and such an extent. In a 1680 journal entry,
Locke explained God’s justice in this way:
the punishments he inflicts on any of his creatures, i.e.
the misery or destruction he brings upon them, can be
nothing else but to preserve the greater or more
considerable part, and so being only for preservation,
his justice is nothing but a branch of his goodness,
which is fain by severity to restrain the irregular and
destructive parts from doing harm; for to imagine God
under a necessity of punishing for any other reason
but this, is to make his justice a great imperfection . . . .
(PE, 278)
Even God, who could hand out perfectly just senten-
ces based on his perfect knowledge, only punishes
with a view to promoting the preservation of more of
his creatures.
Locke’s views on the right of parents to punish
children are parallel to his view about God’s punish-
ment. This power, he claimed, is to be used for the
benefit of the children.
And therefore God Almighty when he would express his
gentle dealing with the Israelites, he tells them, that
though he chastened them, he chastened them as a Man
chastens his Son, Deut. 8. 5. i.e. with tenderness and
affection, and kept them under no severer Discipline
than what was absolutely best for them, and had been
less kindness to have slackened. This is that power to
which Children are commanded Obedience, that the
pains and care of their Parents may not be increased, or
ill rewarded. (TT, 2.67)
In Locke’s view both God and parents are presented
as punishing only out of benevolent motives. Inter-
estingly, another parallel between his account of
parents and his account of God is that in both cases
Locke cites the need to stop rebellion as the reason
that legitimates harsher punishment. The one place
where Locke supports corporal punishment by pa-
rents is in cases where the child is rebellious and
refuses to submit to authority (STCE, 78), just as
Locke argued (as previously noted) that God’s
10Locke rejected the view that Adam’s original sin placed all
human beings in danger of hell in The Reasonableness of
Christianity. Locke argued that the punishment for Adam’s
offspring was simply death, not eternal life in misery (R, 4–6).
The simplest reconciliation of Locke’s statements about the
punishment of the wicked is that it would be of limited duration
(Wainwright 1987, 52–53). Infinite torment is difficult to support
if punishments are not retributive, but limited torments of this
sort might reasonably be expected to encourage obedience to
God’s law.
11See Tuckness (2002) for a discussion of this argument.
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punishments are necessary to prevent rebellion in
God’s kingdom.
Locke and Restitution
Based on the analysis of his predecessors above,
Locke’s rejection of retributivism as a rationale for
the extent of punishment as shown in the previous
section was not unusual. It was the typical position of
other seventeenth-century natural rights thinkers. It
would be a mistake to conclude from this, however,
that Locke was a consequentialist about punishment
in the modern sense of the word. Some distinctions
among various concepts of restitution will help to
explain why. First we can distinguish restitution as a
policy from restitution as a ground for punishment.
One could endorse restitution as a policy on con-
sequentialist grounds by arguing that restitution
schemes happen to improve the net happiness of
citizens (to use utilitarian language) or (using Locke’s
language) to help fulfill the natural law mandate to
preserve mankind as much as possible (TT, 2.134–35).
Restitution as a ground of punishment is different in
that the restoration of the conditions that existed
before the rights violation occurred constitutes a
distinct reason for punishing. In some cases compen-
sating a victim is not the action most conducive to
maximizing either happiness or the preservation of
human life, yet theories that recognize restitution as a
distinct ground for punishment would still call for
restitution in such cases.
The second distinction is between theories of
restitution that demand that as much as possible
payment come from the offender, on the one hand,
and those that aim only at compensating the victim,
on the other. Two contemporary examples illustrate
the difference between these two conceptions of
restitution. In the United States judges can order
restitution awards in which the victim is compen-
sated by the specific criminal responsible for the
crime. In many cases the criminal is unable to pay
restitution and some of the shortfall is made up by a
Victim Compensation Fund. The United States takes
funds from criminal fines and places them in a fund
used to provide compensation and other services
to victims. In Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006, the U.S.
Government collected more than $1.5 billion in this
way (a substantial portion of this money coming
from corporate fines; Office for Victims of Crimes
2007). Many states have similar programs. By con-
trast, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission provided immunity from civil as well as
criminal prosecutions for those who confessed,
meaning that the full weight of reparation demands
fell on the centralized state process (Stanley 2001,
533). In other words, victim compensation in South
Africa was separated from the imposition of fines,
compensatory damages, or punitive damages on
perpetrators.
As we locate Locke’s theory of restitution among
these distinctions, we see that his approach presents
restitution as a distinct rationale, not merely a policy
tool, and that his understanding of this rationale
involves both compensation of the victim and pay-
ment by the offender where possible. Locke stated
that there are two distinct foundations for the right to
punish: ‘‘the one of Punishing the Crime for restraint,
and preventing the like Offence, which right of
punishing is in every body; the other of taking repara-
tion, which belongs only to the injured party’’ (TT,
2.11). We saw earlier that the magistrate has the
authority to remit punishments based on the first
ground where the public good demands it (TT, 2.11).
Locke then explains that the magistrate:
cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private Man,
for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a Right to demand in his own
name, and he alone can remit: The damnified Person
has this Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods
or Service of the Offender, by Right of Self-preservation,
as every Man has a Power to punish the Crime, to
prevent its being committed again, by the Right he has of
Preserving all Mankind, and doing all reasonable things
he can in order to that end[.] (TT, 2.11)
Individuals have the right to press for restitution even
in cases where doing so does not immediately benefit
the public. Locke does not specifically consider limit
cases where a weak state, perhaps after a regime
change, might be destroyed if it permitted individuals
to push for the full restitution they were due, and
Stacey (2004) is likely right that Locke would have
permitted some flexibility in such cases. Locke’s doc-
trine of prerogative does, after all, allow valid legal
claims to be set aside when pressing needs call for it.
Nonetheless, Locke clearly made victim restitution a
high priority by establishing it as a distinct rationale
for punishment.
Even more telling is the following passage from
the 1680 journal entry on God’s justice cited above.
Locke first stated that ‘‘we cannot suppose the exercise
of it [God’s justice] should extend further than his
goodness has need of it for the preservation of his
creatures in the order and beauty of the state he has
placed each of them in’’ (PE, 278). This passage is
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further confirmation for the position noted above,
that even God is presented as punishing based on
forward-looking considerations. The very next section
explains that it is because ‘‘our actions cannot reach
unto him, or bring him any profit or damage’’ (PE,
278) that God’s justice is always oriented toward the
benevolent preservation of his creatures. The qualify-
ing clause is instructive. It is only because our actions
cannot bring God ‘‘any profit or damage’’ (and thus
God never requires restitution) that the only remain-
ing reason to punish is to bring about good con-
sequences. Locke’s qualification here is further
evidence that Locke regarded the right of restitution
as a distinct right that injured parties are allowed to
claim even if doing so causes harm to others.
One slightly puzzling aspect of Locke’s account of
reparations is the underlying justification he gives for
it. In TT 2.11, quoted at the beginning of this section,
Locke stated that the injured party has a right to the
goods and services of the offender ‘‘by Right of Self-
preservation.’’ Locke never explains why this would be
sufficient to ground restitution claims that go beyond
what is needed for reasonable assurances of self-
preservation.12 Perhaps Locke regarded preserving
one’s property as part of preserving one’s life and
so for Locke the right of self-preservation includes the
right of preserving all of one’s justly acquired
property. Locke does, after all, at times use ‘‘prop-
erty’’ in this broad sense (TT 2.87 and 2.123), so it
would not be shocking if ‘‘self-preservation’’ some-
times included preservation of property.
Locke also wrote in a manuscript, unpublished in
his lifetime, that ‘‘it is just that he who has impaired
another man’s good should suffer diminution of his
own’’ (PE, 218). Locke thus not only wanted to see
the victim’s property restored, he wanted to see the
offender’s property diminished as a way of pursuing
that goal if possible. The earlier quoted passage also
specified that the right is not merely to compensation
but to ‘‘the Goods or Service of the Offender’’ (TT,
2.11 my emphasis). This implies that Locke’s account
is both about requiring payment by offenders and
compensating victims. This is related to Locke’s
statement that when fulfilling the natural law com-
mand to preserve lives as much as possible, where a
choice must be made ‘‘the safety of the Innocent is to
be preferred’’ (TT, 2.16). While Locke would not
advocate either killing the guilty or taking their
property in cases where no one would directly or
indirectly benefit (because of his rejection of retribu-
tivism), Locke does think that it is morally desirable
that the lives and property of the innocent be
protected by imposing loss on the guilty.
The Significance of Locke’s Theory
of Punishment
This account of Locke’s theory of punishment is
significant both historically and in terms of its
implications for contemporary theories of punish-
ment. Regarding the historical point, we can now
return to the opening pages of the Second Treatise
where Locke defines political power as ‘‘a Right of
making Laws with Penalties of Death, and conse-
quently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and
Preserving of Property’’ (TT 2.3) and see its relation
to the end of the paragraph where Locke explains that
this power is only to be used ‘‘for the Public Good.’’
From one perspective there is a possible tension
between restitution claims that seek to vindicate
property rights and the public good. While the
government is to seek after the public good, victims
are given an independent right to seek reparations.
Locke resolves this potential contradiction because of
the way he understands the public good. The public
good consists in upholding property rights, broadly
defined. Restitution claims in that sense are almost by
definition part of the public good, though Locke
could use prerogative to override them in cases of
extreme necessity. Whether a person harms my
property by theft (which we would call a criminal
offense) or breach of contract (which we would call a
matter for civil law), from Locke’s perspective gov-
ernments are created to impartially adjudicate such
matters and to inflict penalties that will make it an
‘‘ill-bargain for the offender.’’ In other words, Locke’s
theory of punishment with its emphasis on prevent-
ing crimes against the life, liberty, and property of
citizens and his strong interest in restitution in cases
where these rights have been violated are part of his
larger account of the purposes of government.13
While Locke’s theory at first glance appears to be
a confused mix of statements for and against retrib-
utive punishment, when we situate his statements in
the Second Treatise against the background of the
seventeenth-century natural law writers who preceded12Interestingly, in one of the passages where Locke talks about
some criminals deserving death (TT, 2.23), his point is that it is
fine for the victim and offender to agree to a lesser punishment,
slavery. Deserved death, in this context, likely means that it is
owed to the victim to ensure his future safety.
13So understanding the purposes of government does not mean
that governments are limited to pursuing libertarian policies. On
this see Tuckness (2008, 474–76).
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him as well as the larger corpus of his work, a more
coherent picture emerges. Like Grotius, Hobbes, and
Pufendorf, Locke rejected punishments that were
purely retributive. Like Pufendorf he sometimes used
the language of retribution, but meant something dif-
ferent by deserved punishment. Deserved punishment
for Locke is the punishment appropriate to protect the
rights of citizens.
Locke’s account also challenges our contempo-
rary understanding of the domain of punishment.
Today, we carefully distinguish between civil cases
and criminal cases such that a single act of killing
may require a criminal trial for a charge of murder or
manslaughter and a separate civil trial where a family
might sue for damages for wrongful death. We place
fines in one category and compensatory damages in
another. In these ways we tend to think of restitution
in a different conceptual category from punishment.
Yet the edges of our practice betray the fact that
matters are not quite so simple. Civil trials can result
in ‘‘punitive damages,’’ which generally carry the
implication that they are assessed either to deter
similar acts in the future or for the retributive reason
that the conduct in question was so wicked as to
deserve additional penalties. It would be odd to say
that punitive damages are not punishment. The
mirror image of having ‘‘punitive’’ damages awarded
in civil cases is the fact that judges often have
authority to require restitution as part of criminal
proceedings. Despite our attempts to separate them,
we find ourselves punishing people in civil cases and
requiring compensation in criminal cases. While one
could say that when Locke uses the term punishment
for restitution he uses the term ‘‘punishment’’ differ-
ently than we use it now, part of the reason for
investigating earlier thought is to raise questions
about whether our current ways of categorizing
things really are better. Both civil and criminal cases
often involve imposing penalties on people who are
judged to have violated a legal right. To the extent
that governments exist both to deter rights violations
and to restore property, Locke’s broader conception
of punishment is insightful.
The new conceptual model need not imply that
we overhaul the legal system by getting rid of the legal
distinctions between civil and criminal cases or
between punitive and compensatory damages. There
are other reasonable grounds for keeping them
separate. Worries about state tyranny create a reason
to demand a higher level of proof in criminal cases
than in civil cases, for example. The point rather is
that we should view the distinction between criminal
and civil law as pragmatic rather than principled.
Even more significantly, Locke’s conception of
restitution challenges the distinction between back-
ward-looking and forward-looking rationales for pun-
ishment. As noted above, restitution can be viewed
either as a policy or as a rationale. As a policy there are
any number of other rationales for punishment that
could support it. Restitution as a policy can serve as
a deterrent and provide benefits for victims, both
forward-looking reasons. As a rationale, we can dis-
tinguish between restitution that aims only at com-
pensating victims and restitution that also aims to
compensate them by taking money from criminals.
Either version of restitution as a rationale includes a
backward-looking element. If we ask why either the
criminal or the government should give a sum of
money to a still wealthy victim when there are people
on the verge of starvation who could benefit much
more, we see that restitution is different than a
standard account of benevolence. Benevolence is for-
ward-looking and simply looks at present needs and
asks how one might benefit people. Considerations of
the past would only enter into the decision making
indirectly in cases where the story about how the need
arose is relevant to how beneficial aid will actually be.
In cases of restitution, by contrast, the past plays the
leading role in determining how much should be given
and to whom it should be given. Restitution is thus
backward-looking insofar as it tries to approximate a
previous state of affairs, yet forward-looking in that it
is only imposed when it can benefit others.
Locke’s theory of punishment grew out of a
seventeenth-century approach to political theory that
thought in terms of laws of nature that are morally
obligatory yet are also oriented toward future goods.
For most of these writers, human punishment of
violations of the law was set against a background in
which God would punish violations of natural law as
well. Locke’s theory of punishment can be instructive
even for those who do not agree with the theology
underlying it. Those committed to a more retributive
view of God’s punishment than Locke could still
accept Locke’s account if they believe that the
epistemic differences between divine and human
knowledge of just deserts means that it is wrong for
humans to apply the divine rationale. For those who
reject theological approaches altogether, the basic
account of the goals of punishment in terms of
vindicating rights could be affirmed on the basis of
a secular commitment to rights.
By making a theory of restitution one part of a
larger theory of punishment in a way that transcends
the forward-looking/backward-looking dichotomy,
Locke created a substantive account that has several
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attractive features. Many scholars are critical of what
they take to be the overly retributive tendencies of
current punishment practices in the United States and
argue that we must move beyond backward-looking
views of punishment and take a forward-looking view
instead. If long prison sentences seem to do little to
reduce crime then they should be reduced. Despite the
popularity of this view in academia, there continues to
be strong support for retributive policies from the
broader public. Locke’s account has the potential to
provide a new way of reconciling these positions.
With the reformers a Lockean account would hold
that punishments that merely impose harm and do
not benefit either victims or the society as a whole
should be done away with, but with popular opinion
the Lockean account can still affirm the common
sentiment that those who have wronged others de-
serve to suffer loss if that loss can benefit the victims
of crime. Although retribution and Lockean restitu-
tion are distinct, they both share a concern for
imposing appropriate losses on those who have
wronged others. A scheme of punishment that em-
phasizes restitution more strongly may do better at
harmonizing our conflicting intuitions about punish-
ment. Locke’s theory thus suggests channeling the
common sentiment that harms be imposed on crim-
inals to set aright the scales of justice in the direction
of reparations instead of the direction of retribution.
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